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Abstract
Contemporary historians usually attribute the East India Company￿ s
military success in India to its military strength. In contrast, we argue
that, on its own, military strength was a mixed blessing: it could have
led to the formation of coalitions against the Company. This did not
happen because the Company￿ s commitments to Indian regimes were more
credible than their commitments to each other. In this sense, commitment
was the key to conquest.
11 Introduction
There is a huge and sophisticated literature on why the East India Company,
a trading enterprise, was able to conquer India. The dominant view among
modern historians foregrounds the Company￿ s superior military power, based on
better technology and access to capital, and support from the British state.1 An-
other group of historians, while acknowledging the Company￿ s military strength,
also emphasize the myopia of Indian regimes, arguing that they failed to recog-
nize that their disunity would pave the way for the Company￿ s ascendance,
via serial conquest.2 A variant of this view (Stein 2001, p.209) emphasizes the
Company￿ s organizational structure, arguing that Indian regimes were "lulled"
into a false sense of security because they were aware that authorities in London
(with oversight over the Company in India) were conservative, and opposed to
risky warfare. In this paper we consider the three factors discussed above: the
expectations of Indian regimes, the Company￿ s military power, and the role of
its organizational structure. We argue that (i) Indian regimes were not myopic
￿they fully anticipated the long-term territorial threat posed by the Company;
(ii) The Company￿ s organizational structure constrained its o¢ cials in India;
while they often broke agreements, fear of censure from London put a ceiling
on the extent of contract violation; (iii) But for this the Company￿ s military
strength could have been a disadvantage.
We develop our argument by examining the period 1785-1800, a decisive
phase in which the Company made the transition from being one of the im-
portant players on the subcontinent, to being the "Paramount Power." The
Company had two credible rivals in 1785: the Maratha confederacy, centered in
Poona in western India, and especially, the southern kingdom of Mysore, which
1See, for instance, Gordon (1998, pp. 193-94). Bayly (1999, p. 97) argues that the
British "were able to conquer the Indian subcontinent within a period of two generations
because they commanded the Indian seas and the Bengal revenues," but also goes on to
emphasize the importance of its success in information gathering and military intelligence.
2The introduction to Regani (1963, p. i), by P. Sreenivas Char, quotes M.S. Mehta on the
short-sightedness of Indian regimes: "It is a sad commentary on their sagacity and judgment
that they should have failed to understand the simple phenomenon that mutual enmity and
disunion were bound to destroy the sovereignty and independence which they so proudly
wished to preserve."
2historians consider the Company￿ s ￿most formidable and most determined￿foe
(Moon 1990, p. 291). By 1800, the Company had defeated Mysore with the
help of the Marathas and the writing was on the wall: Contemporary observers
could foresee the Company￿ s future defeat of the Marathas and its domination
of the subcontinent.3 What accounts for this outcome?
To organize ideas, we use a simple game-theoretic model with three players
with di⁄erent levels of military strength. We model players as being "rational,"
in the sense of forward-looking, rather than myopic, because there is ample
evidence for this. The Marathas were able to anticipate that, after allying with
them today, the Company might turn on them tomorrow. For instance, a key
Maratha minister wrote to the ruler of Mysore in 1782, regarding the Company.
Divide and Grab is their main principle....They are bent upon
subjugating the states of Poona, Nagpur, Mysore and Haidarabad
one by one, by enlisting the sympathy of one to put down the others.
They know best how to destroy the Indian cohesion.
Similarly, Ahilyabai Holkar, at the head of an important component of the
Maratha Confederacy had earlier warned of the risks of allying with the Com-
pany:
Other beasts, like tigers, can be killed by might or contrivance,
but to kill a bear it is very di¢ cult. It will die only if you kill it
straight in the face, Or else, once caught in its powerful hold, the
bear will kill its prey by tickling. Such is the way of the English.
And in view of this, it is di¢ cult to triumph over them.4
Clearly, there was no myopia here.
3Nana Fadnavis, the Maratha minister, wrote in 1800: "Tipu is ￿nished; the British power
has increased; the whole of East India is already theirs; Poona will be the next victim...There
seems to be no escape from destiny." Even earlier, in 1792, after the Third Mysore War,
contemporary French observers noted that by allying against Mysore, the Company￿ s other
Indian rivals were "enfeebling the only Power ￿ qui puisse an imposer aux anglais" (Thompson
1943, p. 4).
4Cited by Kamath and Kher (1995, p. 126).
3What was the role of the Company￿ s organizational structure? The Company
was dependent on the British government for military support and for what we
would today call ￿nancial bailouts. It therefore had to accept supervision in the
form of a "Board of Control," which was skeptical of the Company￿ s tendency
to initiate expensive wars, as was the Company￿ s own Court of Directors. The
Company also had numerous enemies in London, resentful of its trade monopoly
and the wealth and in￿ uence of its returning "nabobs." Therefore, the behavior
of Company o¢ cials came under intense scrutiny. This meant that while the
Company in India could and did violate contracts with other regimes, this was
costly, and this tended to moderate its bad faith. A good example of this
is provided by Fisher (1987). In 1800 the Company was tempted to annex
Avadh, a rich but militarily weak region that had been its ally since 1764. The
Company was, however, restrained by the fear of reaction in London and India,
so it annexed merely half of Avadh! Thus, the Company in India consistently
acted in "constrained bad faith."5 On the other hand, the Indian regimes, which
had no such oversight, faced no such constraints. We model this by assuming
that when the Company broke contracts it bore a cost "c" and the other regimes
bore no cost. We refer to c as "commitment ability."
Our initial (benchmark) model has three players, with di⁄ering military
strengths, all whom can violate contracts at no cost. If one player is over-
whelming, i.e. stronger than the other two taken together, he wins (this is
obvious). But if he is not overwhelming he loses, because the other two play-
ers gang up against him. We then allow the strongest player to have a cost of
violating a contract, c. We ￿nd that the strongest player can enter a winning
coalition only if c is high enough, i.e. if its commitment ability is large enough
to compensate for its military advantage. We then turn to the history, and ar-
5Even Richard Wellesley, often considered the most aggressive Governor-General, was vul-
nerable to his critics. In 1804 he became enraged with a subordinate for reasons his personal
secretary explained as follows: "Whatever your motives may have been, your conduct has
certainly placed Lord Wellesley in a very embarrassing position...Your having shown a great
disposition to admit the justice of Scindiah￿ s right to Gwalior and Gohud is likely, Lord Welles-
ley thinks to give his enemies in Leadenhall Street room to found an accusation against Lord
Wellesley of injustice and rapacity..." (Thompson 1943, p. 98).
4gue that the coalition of the Company (the strongest player) with the Marathas
(the weakest) came about because the Company had the commitment ability to
compensate for its military strength.
We support our claim regarding the potential disadvantage of military power
by comparing the Company￿ s success in forming alliances in two situations. The
Company￿ s defeat of Mysore occurred in two con￿ icts, separated by seven years.
In the intervening period the Company had become more powerful and Mysore
had been weakened. We show that this may have lessened the appeal of the
Company as an ally and increased that of Mysore. Military power, short of
being overwhelming, was a mixed blessing. We also report that, after defeating
Mysore, the Company behaved exactly as we have argued above, in bad faith,
but with some restraint. Finally, we have a brief discussion of what happened
when London stopped constraining Company o¢ cials in India.
The next section of this paper provides some historical background, and
describes the political situation in India the late 1780￿ s. This section yields the
assumptions that underpin the model which we present in the third section. We
then return to the history, using the model to guide our interpretation. The
￿nal section summarizes and concludes.
2 The Company and its Rivals
The three major players discussed in the introduction (Company, Marathas,
Mysore), and a fourth, the Nizam of Hyderabad (much weaker and militarily
"non-pivotal") were intermittently at war in various permutations and com-
binations from the 1760￿ s to the 1780￿ s.6 As mentioned earlier, we focus on
the period 1785-1800, when the Company went from being one of three major
players to being the dominant power.
The Company￿ s military prowess was much-feared; there was a history of rel-
atively small numbers of Company troops defeating much larger armies. How-
6The Nizam￿ s military strength was insu¢ cient to change the outcome of con￿icts among
the other three, so we have suppressed discussion of his role, though it receives attention in
the literature.
5ever by the 1780￿ s Mysore, under the leadership ￿rst of Haidar Ali and then his
son, Tipu Sultan, was growing in strength. Mysore had held its own in con￿ ict
with the Company in the early 1780￿ s, and the Company￿ s prestige had dimin-
ished somewhat. The potential threat from Tipu was also periodically enhanced
by the fear that he would receive assistance from the French. The Company￿ s
own perception was that while it had an edge over Mysore, it could do with
some help: Governor-General Cornwallis wrote to Charles Malet, his emissary
to the Marathas￿court in Poona, emphasizing the importance of their support,
noting that without it "I could not ￿ atter myself with a certain prospect of
the speedy conclusion as well as the decided success of the war" (Ali 1982, pp.
194-95).7 Given this history it seems fair to characterize the Company as the
most powerful player, followed closely by Mysore.
The comparison between Tipu and the Marathas seems more clear-cut. Tipu
had bested a coalition of the Marathas and the Nizam in the mid-1780￿ s (Sen
1974, Hasan 1971), though this was by no means a rout. Tipu￿ s advantage was,
on the one hand, that he had adopted European military tactics and hardware
(Brittlebank 1987, Hasan 1971). Also, the Marathas, who were a coalition in
themselves, lacked internal cohesion, whereas Tipu had a more uni￿ed force,
which he personally commanded.8
Given this background, we write down a model of three players, in which
none could single-handedly overwhelm the other two.9
None of the parties trusted each other, but there was one fundamental dif-
ference between the Company and its rivals: Company o¢ cials in India were
answerable to higher authorities who might hold them personally accountable for
contractual violation or military atrocities. A description of an alleged massacre
7Similarly, in a letter to Pitt in 1790 (Sen 1974, p. 98) Paul Ben￿eld wrote: "The su¢ -
ciency of our military force in that part of the world, for such an undertaking, is, I conclude,
unquestionable; but the resources for the inevitable expenses, and for supplies of stores and
provisions, necessary for so important an undertaking, must be less certain. It will be fortu-
nate if the politics of the two courts, of the Marathas and the Nizam are found su¢ ciently
steady to be counted upon, in the pursuit of a great political plan."
8See section 4, footnote 16.
9Sardesai (1968, p. 182) explicitly argues that any two of these players could have defeated
the third.
6of civilians by Company troops in 1783 was inserted into the 1784 publication
of Edmund Burke￿ s Annual Register.10 The best example of the cost of contract
violation was, however, the famous trial of Warren Hastings, the ￿rst Governor-
General (1772-1784), upon his return to England (Dirks 2006). Key articles
of impeachment pertained to political decisions, not just personal corruption.
One allegation related to Hastings￿ s treatment of the Raja of Benares, a Com-
pany￿ s client: Under ￿nancial pressure, Hastings had increased his demands for
taxes, beyond the contracted amount. Chait Singh had resisted, negotiated,
and ￿nally rebelled. Another charge against Warren Hastings pertained to the
demands he placed on the Begums (Queens) of Avadh, a Company ally, again to
obtain resources for the Company. For our purposes it is not especially relevant
whether or not Hastings was guilty (he was acquitted) ￿our point is he was
answerable to superiors and political enemies in a way that Indian rulers were
not.
Two examples pertaining to Tipu Sultan highlight the contrast. In 1785,
Tipu and the Marathas entered into a dispute involving the taxation of a minor
chieftain whose land, formerly in Maratha territory, was now under Tipu￿ s con-
trol. After mutual threats and military mobilization by both parties, an agree-
ment was reached, which guaranteed the safety of the chieftain. Du⁄ (1826, p.
5) reports that Tipu then practiced a "gross deception." The chieftain and his
family were "treacherously seized; his daughter was reserved for the Sultan￿ s
seraglio, and the rest were immured in a Cabuldroog [a fortress] where they
perished."11 Another example of contract violation occured after the war of the
mid-1780s referenced above was ended by the Treaty of Gajendragad. Tipu
immediately violated the agreement and seized a region called Kittur. This
incident was later invoked by a British negotiator persuading the Marathas to
10The allegation was vigorously refuted, but Wilks (1810), a Company o¢ cial who wrote
perhaps the best-known political history of South India of that period, still felt the need to
address this issue decades later.
11Tipu Sultan is a much-vili￿ed ￿gure in Indian history, and we should worry about "orien-
talist" descriptions of him, especially by contemporary British writers However, this incident
is described in a similar manner by Deodhar (1962, p. 137), who bases himself on both British
and Marathi sources, and Sardesai (1968, Volume 2, p. 178), considered a standard source on
Maratha history. And in any case, for our purposes, it is the perceptions that mattered.
7join the Company against Mysore: "...[H]as he [Tipu] not lately infringed the
treaty concluded with you, and insulted your honour by the violent seizure of
Kittor...?" (Sen 1974, p. 70). Tipu undoubtedly su⁄ered reputation costs, but
there was no superior authority to chastise him.
To capture this di⁄erence between the Company and its rivals, in the model
we assign the strongest player a positive cost of contract violation. To allow
a role for expectations we assume that military powers today are known, but
there is some uncertainty about what they will be in the future.
3 The Model
Our world is comprised of three players ￿ 1, 2 and 3. There are two time
periods. In period 1, each player i has military strength p1




3 are commonly known at the beginning of period 1. If he survives
after period 1, player i￿ s military strength in period 2 is denoted by a random
variable p2
i; the actual value of which is realized and commonly known only at




3: Let ￿i>j denote the ex-ante probability that in period 2






Assumption 2 If p1
i > p1
j, then ￿i>j > 1
2: Also, if p1
i > p1
j; then for any player




k for any i and j:
The ￿rst assumption is simply a naming convention. The second assumption
states that a player who is strong (relative to others) in the ￿rst period has a
greater chance of remaining relatively strong in the second period. The third
assumption states that no player is overwhelmingly powerful. This assumption
was discussed in the previous section.
8In period 1, players form coalitions and a war takes place between the rival
coalitions. Members of a coalition sign a de jure contract agreeing to (i) Not
attack each other in future; and (ii) share the surplus (which is normalized to
1) in a certain proportion. The coalition with a greater cumulative military
strength wins. The vanquished are eliminated and the victors go into the next
period.
The de jure contract between, say players i and j with surplus allocations
￿ and 1￿￿, which we can denote by C(i;j;￿;1￿￿); is a non-state contingent
contract. However, upon entering the second period, the more powerful of the
two partners has the ability to defeat the other and capture the entire surplus.
We model the contractual constraints against this kind of violation as a cost of
breaking the contract which, for player i, we denote by ci: Hence, player i, if he is
more powerful than player j; will violate the contract C(i;j;￿;1￿￿) if and only
if 1￿ci > ￿: Similarly player j; when more powerful, will violate the contract if
and only if 1￿cj > 1￿￿: Since the players are assumed to be forward looking,
they will anticipate this behavior while negotiationg the contract. Thus, the de
facto contract they negotiate in period one can be described as C(i;j;￿i;￿j);
where ￿i ￿ maxf￿;1 ￿ cig and ￿j ￿ maxf1 ￿ ￿;1 ￿ cjg denote the payo⁄s
to players when they are more powerful than their rival.12 For our analysis
hereafter we will model this de facto contract.
A coalition C(i;j;￿i;￿j) is said to be a stable coalition if there is no other
coalition that would be more attractive to either member and to player k; i.e. a
coalition is stable if its members cannot be lured away by any non-member(s) by
proposing an alternative coalition. Moreover, a coalition is a winning coalition
if the members are stronger than the non-members collectively.
We can characterize the set of two-player stable winning coalitions as follows.
In a coalition C(i;j;￿i;￿j) player i￿ s expected payo⁄is: ￿i>j￿￿i+(1￿￿i>j)(1￿
￿j): Since the excluded player gets eliminated (which yields zero payo⁄), he will
be willing to propose any alternative coalition that gives him a non-negative
12Since a coalition can be identi￿ed with a contract, we shall use the terms coalition and
contract interchangeably.
9payo⁄. The best payo⁄ player k can credibly o⁄er player i in the event that
player k is dominant is ck: Therefore, the best alternative coalition that k can
propose to player i is C(i;k;1;1￿ck):13 Under this coalition, the expected payo⁄
of player i is: ￿i>k￿1+(1 ￿ ￿i>k)ck: Hence, the coalition C(i;j;￿i;￿j) is a stable
winning coalition if the following conditions are satis￿ed.
￿i>j ￿ ￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i>j)(1 ￿ ￿j) ￿ ￿i>k ￿ 1 + (1 ￿ ￿i>k)ck and (1)
￿j>i ￿ ￿j + (1 ￿ ￿j>i)(1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿j>k ￿ 1 + (1 ￿ ￿j>k)ck: (2)
We are particularly interested in understanding which coalitions emerge and
their relationship with the distribution of military powers and commitment abil-
ities of players.
3.1 Game without Commitment Ability
In our framework this case is equivalent to ci = 0 for each player i: Since
￿i = maxf￿;1￿cig; we always have ￿i = 1 for each player i: Plugging this into
the inequalities (1) and (2), we get
￿i>j ￿ ￿i>k and ￿j>i ￿ ￿j>k:
These conditions are satis￿ed if and only if player k is stronger than both players
i and j: Hence, we get the result: when no player has the commitment
ability, there is a unique stable winning coalition comprised of players
2 and 3.
3.2 Game with Commitment Ability for player 1
As we saw in the previous sub-section, when no player has the ability to commit,
player 1, who is the strongest player, is eliminated by a coalition of weaker
players! What happens when player 1 has commitment ability while the other
13The corresponding de jure contract would be C(i;k;1;0).
10two players do not?14 Player 1 will be able to "lure away" player i 2 f2;3g if
he can credibly o⁄er him a coalition C(1;i;￿1;￿i) which yields i a better payo⁄
than he obtains in the 2-3 coalition. Hence, player 1 must o⁄er player i at least
￿i>j where i 6= j;i;j 2 f2;3g: The "best" coalition player 1 can credibly o⁄er
player i is C(1;i;1￿c1;1) which gives him the payo⁄ (1￿￿i>1)￿c1 +(￿i>1)(1):
Hence we require that for some i 2 f2;3g
(1 ￿ ￿i>1) ￿ c1 + (￿i>1)(1) > ￿i>j
which can be rearranged as




In words, player 1 can lure away player i if he has su¢ cient commitment ability
to compensate for the greater future threat he poses to player i: Since ￿j>i <
￿1>i, we know that c1 2 [0;1].
Which player from f2;3g will player 1 pick for his partner? For any proposed
coalition C(1;i;￿i;1) player 1￿ s expected payo⁄ is ￿1>i ￿￿i: Hence, if a contract
is acceptable to both players 2 and 3, 1 would rather o⁄er it to player 3. That
is, if







then player 1 will choose 3 as his partner, otherwise he will pick the player for
whom inequality (3) is satis￿ed. Inequality (3) also tells us that, ceteris paribus,
2-3 coalition is more likely to be stable if i) player 1 is strong (￿1>2 and ￿1>3
are large); and ii) there is a relative balance of power between 2 and 3 (i.e.,
￿3>2 and ￿2>3 are close to 1/2).
3.2.1 Coalitions involving player 1
For a coalition C(1;i;￿1;1) between players 1 and i to be a stable, winning
coalition we need to ensure that player j cannot lure away either player 1 or
14For sake of completeness it should be mentioned here that if players 2 and 3 have non-
negative commitment abilities while player 1 has no commitment ability, we still will get 2-3
as a unique stable winning coalition.
11player i: Since player j has no commitment ability, the only coalition he can
o⁄er either player k 2 f1;ig is C(j;k : 1;1):
￿ Player 1 cannot be lured away by j as long as




￿ Player i cannot be lured away by j as long as




By inspecting conditions (4) and (5) we can draw the following conclusions:
1. Player 3 can always destabilize any feasible 1-2 coalition by lur-
ing away player 1. This follows from substituting j = 3 and i = 2
in condition (4) and observing that
￿1>3
￿1>2 > 1 while ￿1 cannot exceed
1. The intuition is straightforward: Player 1 prefers 3 because he is less
threatening in the future.
2. A necessary condition for a 1-3 coalition to be stable is that
￿2>3 ￿ ￿1>2; (6)
i.e. the lower bound on ￿1 must be smaller than the upper bound on it.
In addition to the above condition we must also ensure the ￿1 is credible,
i.e. ￿1 ￿ 1 ￿ c1: This provides another necessary condition for a 1-3 to be a
stable winning coalition, viz.




Conditions (6) and (7) are jointly su¢ cient for there being a stable winning
coalition between player 1 and 3. Moreover, by observing that the condition
(7) is same as condition (3) we can see that the two conditions that are jointly
12su¢ cient for a stable winning coalition 1-3 also guarantee that it is the unique
stable winning coalition.
Thus, our model suggests that a unique stable winning coalition between
players 1 and 3 will likely emerge as long as i) player 1 is not "too strong," and
ii) there is an imbalance of power between players 2 and 3.
To sum up,
1. 1. A coalition between 1 and 2 can never be stable.
2. If







then there is a unique stable winning coalition between players 2 and 3.
3. If conditions (6) and (7) are satis￿ed, then there is a unique stable winning
coalition between players 1 and 3.




￿1>2g then there is
no stable coalition.15
The next section of this paper interprets the history in light of the model.
The reader may recall that we have identi￿ed the Company, Tipu, and the
Marathas as players 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
4 War and Alliances
We have previously mentioned, in the introduction, that in the decisive con￿ ict
between Tipu Sultan and the Company, the Third Mysore War (ending in 1792)
a Company-Maratha alliance was formed.16 In terms of our model, this is a 1-
3 coalition. This requires (6) and (7) to hold. Equation (7) ensures that
15In this case, player 1 is at an advantage if c1 ￿ 1 ￿
￿2>3
￿1>3 : there exists a {1,3} coalition
that can be destabilized by player 2 only by luring player 1 away. Also, as argued earlier, any
{1,2} coalition can be destabilized by player 3 by luring away player 1.
16The "Marathas" were actually a fractious coalition of their own, often called a "confed-
eracy." The central component was in Poona, headed by the Peshwa. The Peshwa signed a
treaty with the Company and fought in the Third Mysore War. The other two major elements
of the Maratha coalition, Holkar and Scindia, stayed neutral.
13the Marathas cannot be lured away from the Company-Maratha coalition. (6)
ensures that the Company itself cannot be lured away from this coalition. For
the purposes of this paper, (7) is key, because it guarantees the survival of the
Company ￿it can always make a su¢ ciently attractive o⁄er to retain Marathas
as an ally. When will this condition hold? Clearly, it is more likely to hold
when the Company has more commitment ability. It is also more likely to hold
when
￿2>3
￿1>3is large, which will occur when Company and Tipu are relatively close
in military strength. We argued this was the case, in section 2. Thus, in our
view, the Company-Maratha coalition came about because the Company had
enough commitment ability to o⁄set the slightly greater future military threat
it posed to the Marathas.17
To extend our analysis we would, ideally, like to consider two counter-
factuals: (a) The outcome if Tipu had been weaker, the Company was stronger,
or both (b) The outcome if the Company lost its (limited) commitment ability,
and became as unrestrained as Tipu. We are partly able to examine (a), below.
Of course we don￿ t have an equivalent to (b), but we will discuss a famous event
that is suggestive.
The Marathas were not myopic during the Third Mysore War; they antici-
pated the future threat from the Company. Therefore, their goal was to weaken
Tipu, not eliminate him, thereby retaining him as a potential ally.18 Once it
was evident that Tipu would be defeated the Marathas made clear their pref-
erence for hostilities to end; the coup de grace should not be delivered. Tipu
gave up considerable territory, and a peace treaty was signed in 1792. This
peace treaty was respected until a new and more aggressive Governor-General,
Richard Wellesley, took charge of Company administration in India. Wellesley
increased the Company￿ s military force, and sought a pretext to attack Tipu,
17Though equation 6 is less important for our purposes, we have made the case for it in
section 2: the Tipu-Maratha power di⁄erential (￿2>3) was larger than the Company-Tipu
power di⁄erential (￿1>2).
18Charles Malet, the Company￿ s representative in the Poona Court wrote to Governor-
General Cornwallis in 1791 that he was "apprehensive that you will experience a strong ten-
dency on the part of the allies to evasion and delay in commencing the operations....[consistent
with] their object of reducing, rather by holding up in terror than by striking the dreaded
blow, the enemy to their terms..." (Poona Residency Correspondence III, p. 511).
14which he conveniently provided. Wellesley then declared war and there was
now another round of negotiations, with the Company and Tipu again vying
for Maratha support. Again, for the Marathas to prefer the Company, equation
7 had to be satis￿ed. But this was harder now. The right hand side had risen
for two reasons: The Company was stronger, and Tipu was weaker.
What actually happened? In some respects this is a murky story ￿ the
Marathas had fallen out amongst themselves and there was much negotiation,
plotting, and intrigue, between the Company￿representatives, Tipu￿ s represen-
tatives, and the Poona Court. However, the outcome was clear: de facto, the
Marathas remained neutral. The Company defeated (and killed) Tipu without
their help. To the extent the Marathas tilted in any direction, it was towards
Tipu. Du⁄ (1826), drawing on the correspondence between Wellesley and his
emissary to the Poona Court, concludes:
Bajee Row imagined...he should deceive both parties, and post-
pone his ultimate decision, until circumstances enabled him to judge
on which side it would be most advantageous to range himself. As
far, however, as he was capable of following any plan, his resolution
was taken in favor of Tippoo.
Modern historians read the evidence in the same way. For instance, Hasan
(1971 p. 304), also argues that the Peshwa had decided to join Tipu but "was not
bold enough to implement the decision." As our model predicts, the weakening
of Tipu and the strengthening of the Company had increased the appeal of the
former.
After defeating Tipu, the Company, as anticipated, extracted surplus from
its allies, threatening war when necessary. The most common method was to
insist that the ruler pay for a military contingent under the Company￿ s control.
But the Company still had to worry about its critics and could not act entirely
arbitrarily. Of its two allies in the war against Tipu, the Nizam of Hyderbad
survived right until Indian independence, despite numerous disputes, especially
regarding his payments for the military force. The case of the Maratha Peshwa
15is less clear-cut; his territory was annexed in 1818, but he was left with an
enormous pension. Indeed, Fisher (1991) reports that rulers deposed by the
Company received on average one-￿fth of the revenues of their regions. This
behavior, where contract violations occur, but the weaker party is still left some
surplus, is exactly what we have called "constrained bad faith."
The experiment (b) referred to at the beginning of this section, where the
Company￿ s commitment ability was lowered, unfortunately came a bit late (for
our analytical purposes!). As the Company became more secure in India, au-
thorities in London encouraged more aggressive policy. In 1841 the Court of
Directors told the Governor-General not to give up any "just and honorable
accession of territory" (quoted by Fisher 1996, p. 21). This policy was vig-
orously implemented, especially by Governor-General Dalhousie (1848-56), and
various Indian states were annexed under legal pretexts, and the catch-all "mis-
governance." Pensions of some deposed rulers were withdrawn. Finally, in 1856,
Avadh, which had been partly taken over in 1800, was now fully annexed.19 The
Mutiny/Civil Rebellion of 1857 followed, in which Indian soldiers in the British
army rebelled, supported by local populations in some areas, and deposed rulers
like the Rani of Jhansi, and the ruling family of Avadh played important roles.
Many other Indian rulers who had retained their status remained loyal to the
Company. The Rebellion was crushed, and the Crown took over in 1858. The
importance of British commitments to Indian rulers was recognized, and Queen
Victoria pledged to respect their privileges. Henceforth Indian states were left
largely untouched. The causes behind the Mutiny/Rebellion were numerous and
complex, so we make the comparison with the Mysore wars with some trepida-
tion. But the reader will have anticipated our general point: if the Company,
had, like Tipu, been viewed as an unconstrained arbitrary power it would, like
him, have failed to ￿nd essential allies.
19The Company was also resented for its interference in indigenous religious and cultural
practices, and its alteration of long-standing land tenure rights in some regions.
165 Concluding Remarks
The analysis in this paper draws on, but di⁄erentiates itself from, several strands
in the literature on the conquest of India. Unlike the triumphant colonial o¢ -
cial, we do not celebrate the virtues of British "good faith;" instead, we argue
that the Company￿ s institutional structure imposed just enough restrictions on
the Company in India to moderate its bad faith and di⁄erentiate it from its
Indian rivals. Unlike some nationalist historians we do not ￿nd Indian regimes￿
"disunity" short-sighted ￿we view this as a rational response in an environment
where there were few mechanisms to make military commitments credible. The
Company￿ s military strength is, of course, central to virtually any discussion,
including ours; we point out, however, that absent certain features of its organi-
zational structure, its military strength could have been a disadvantage. Thus,
by analyzing the role of commitment ability, which is at the heart of much re-
cent literature in development and economic history (North 1990; Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson 2001) we have provided a uni￿ed analysis that provides
insights into a long-debated question.
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